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COMMENT 
IT’S ABOUT TIME:   
A SYSTEMS THINKING ANALYSIS OF THE LITIGATION FINANCE 
INDUSTRY AND ITS EFFECT ON SETTLEMENT 
MARIEL RODAK†
INTRODUCTION 
The developing litigation finance industry is applauded by those 
who champion its access-granting and bargaining-power-equalizing 
functions for low-income plaintiffs in civil suits, and derided by those 
who warn of its unsavory business practices and interference with set-
tlement efforts.  With no current body of law adequately addressing 
the potential problems this burgeoning industry creates, it is vital to 
develop an approach to litigation finance that protects both the integ-
rity of the settlement process and consumer interests.  Such an ap-
proach simultaneously must avoid excessive regulation that effectively 
hinders court access by precluding disadvantaged plaintiffs with viable 
claims from having their days in court.  Applying systems thinking to 
the field of litigation finance and its effect on settlement reveals a 
simple objective that would best achieve the necessary balance be-
tween this new field’s angels and demons:  reducing the time delay 
currently plaguing civil courts. 
Part I of this Comment explores the general structure, history, 
and current status of litigation finance, identifying the circumstances 
that stimulated its creation and describing its prototypical operation.  
Part I also briefly reviews existing legal doctrines that have been, or 
could potentially be, used to regulate litigation finance, including 
champerty, usury, and contract law.  Part II examines the widely di-
verging viewpoints about the litigation finance industry, focusing in 
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particular on the industry’s effect on settlement.  Ultimately, Part II 
concludes that, despite the positive aspects of litigation finance—
particularly, increased court access and bargaining power—a modi-
cum of reform is nonetheless necessary to alleviate its negative aspects, 
which include dubious ethical practices, consumer exploitation, and 
arguable encouragement of frivolous litigation. 
Finally, Part III provides an explanation of the general principles 
of systems thinking, posits that systems thinking is the best way to ap-
proach any attempt to regulate the litigation finance industry, and ar-
gues that the best method of regulation is for courts to work to reduce 
the time between when a claim is brought and when it is terminated 
by either settlement or trial.  A reduction in time delay would curtail 
the negative effects of litigation finance by limiting the number of 
plaintiffs who require such financial assistance, the sum required by 
those plaintiffs who do need assistance, and the accumulation of in-
terest on the principal amount advanced.  The industry would never-
theless be able to continue to provide its service to those plaintiffs 
most in need. 
I.  THE LITIGATION FINANCE INDUSTRY:  AN OVERVIEW 
A.  History and Structure 
Litigation financing, the provision of cash advances to plaintiffs 
prior to the resolution of their claims,1 has evolved from a virtually 
unknown and relatively isolated practice to a veritable and thriving 
industry.2  The litigation finance industry owes its development to a 
convergence of factors that left fertile soil for its explosive growth.  As-
tounding technological and informational innovations and their ensu-
ing availability to the masses—particularly the ability to use the Inter-
1 See Terry Carter, Cash Up Front:  New Funding Sources Ease Financial Strains on 
Plaintiffs Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2004, at 34, 34 (describing litigation financing, or “pre-
settlement funding,” as the business of giving cash advances to plaintiffs “before trial or 
settlement”).  There are several variations on litigation financing.  For example, some 
companies aggregate the claims they acquire and sell shares of the composite funds.  
Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 798 (2004).  In addition, some litigation financiers provide 
cash advances to plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Carter, supra, at 34.  For the purposes of this 
Comment, though, the phrase “litigation financing” will mean a direct cash-advance 
arrangement between a litigation finance company and a plaintiff in a civil action. 
2 See Kirk Hansen, New Schemes Target Potential Settlements, CLAIMS MAG., Nov. 2003, 
at 48, 48 (noting that, as of the article’s publication, there were more than one hun-
dred litigation finance businesses). 
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net to establish a business and the accompanying proliferation of 
methods allowing for more, faster, and cheaper communication with 
potential customers—certainly comprise one such factor, as they re-
moved previously existing barriers to entering the marketplace.3  Sky-
rocketing litigation costs,4 combined with both the prohibition on at-
torneys advancing living expenses to their clients5 and the refusal of 
traditional lenders to recognize pending litigation as an asset when 
determining qualification for borrowing, left an increasing number of 
plaintiffs financially unable to pursue their claims.6  Finally, a signifi-
cant deterioration of laws against champerty—the acquisition of fi-
nancial interest in a legal claim by a third party—removed any imme-
diate fear of liability that may otherwise have prevented entrepreneurs 
from embarking upon the business of litigation finance.7
The self-proclaimed father of the modern litigation finance indus-
try is former “rock musician and mobile-home park developer” Perry 
Walton.8  Walton was convicted of extortionate collection of debt in 
1997 and then turned to litigation finance for his new career, con-
ducting instructional seminars on how to successfully get started in 
3 See Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry:  The Wild West of Finance 
Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 56 (2004) (remarking 
upon the role of technology in the creation of the litigation finance industry); see also 
Hansen, supra note 2, at 48 (describing a now-defunct website, modeled after eBay, 
that operated as an online marketplace for unsettled claims). 
4 See Donald L. Abraham, Investor-Financed Lawsuits:  A Proposal To Remove Two Bar-
riers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1992) 
(dividing fiscal burdens on plaintiffs into access fees, such as filing fees, and equipage 
costs, such as attorney and expert witness fees, and noting that, while access fees have 
declined, “significant equipage barriers remain”). 
5 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2003) (forbidding attorneys 
from providing financial assistance beyond litigation costs to clients).  For an argu-
ment that such rules should be changed to allow attorneys to offer financial support to 
their clients, see James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale:  The “Acquisition 
of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 
246-47 (2003). 
6 See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money:  The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 649, 650 (2005) (“[M]ost traditional lenders are unwilling to lend 
money with only a potential litigation recovery as collateral because such loans are 
deemed to be too risky.”). 
7 See Adam Liptak, Lenders to Those Who Sue Are Challenged on Rates:  In Ohio Case, 
Court Says Fees Are Too High, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2003, at A15 (“[A]n erosion of the pro-
hibition on investing in others’ lawsuits, or champerty, has helped create the indus-
try.”).  For a definition of champerty and assessment of its current application, see in-
fra Part I.C.1. 
8 Richard B. Schmitt, Staking Claims:  A Las Vegas Lender Tests Odds in Court—And 
Forms an Industry, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2000, at A1. 
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the business as well as managing a firm of his own.9  Litigation financ-
ing is a recent innovation, with its seeds sowed “on a small scale little 
more than a decade ago with cash advances to individual plaintiffs 
needing money to keep their lives or their lawsuits going.”10  Since its 
inception, the field has grown considerably, garnering attention from 
the bench, the bar, and external analysts alike. 
The litigation finance process typically begins when a plaintiff is 
referred to a litigation finance company by her attorney; however, 
such businesses frequently employ advertising techniques that facili-
tate direct contact from potential clients as well.11  After a plaintiff 
seeking funding submits an application to a particular company, an 
employee (only in some instances an attorney) solicits information 
about and reviews the applicant’s legal claim to determine whether or 
not the application will be accepted and a financing contract subse-
quently executed.12  Described as promoting a “new twist on legalized 
gambling,”13 litigation financiers offer nonrecourse funding—if the 
plaintiff ultimately loses her case at trial she has no obligation to repay 
9 See Martin, supra note 3, at 70 (quoting Walton as asserting that “‘[p]retty much 
everybody who got their start in the industry got it from me’”); Schmitt, supra note 8, at 
A1 (describing Walton’s nefarious entrance into litigation funding and the uncertain 
legality of his actions).  Walton has since faced legal troubles in his new career as well:  
he and his Future Settlement Funding Corporation were held liable for wrongful inter-
ference with a contract and unfair and deceptive trade practices by a North Carolina 
jury.  Gary Young, Two Setbacks for Lawsuit Financing:  But the Practice Is Still Alive, N.J. 
L.J., Aug. 18, 2003, at 21.  Stories such as this lend support to the arguments of those 
who condemn the litigation finance industry as inherently disreputable.  See infra Part 
II.B for a further discussion of these viewpoints. 
10 Carter, supra note 1, at 34. 
11 See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 799 (characterizing the litigation fi-
nance claim-acquisition process as including both attorney referrals and advertise-
ments on websites and in professional journals); Am. Legal Fin. Ass’n, FAQs, 
http://www.americanlegalfin.com/alfasite2/faqs.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) [here-
inafter ALFA FAQs] (“ALFA receives much of its business from attorney referrals.”). 
12 See ALFA FAQs, supra note 11 (“Each ALFA member employs legal analysts or 
attorneys who review the pending case of each applicant by examining legal docu-
ments and speaking with the client’s attorney.  Only those plaintiffs with meritorious 
cases and a good likelihood of success become eligible for advance funding support.”); 
infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing how this process may create ethi-
cal concerns relating to confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege). 
13 Elizabeth Sniegocki, The Advanced Litigation Funding Industry:  Gambling on Jus-
tice?, FLA. UNDERWRITER, May 2003, at 29, 29. 
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the amount advanced, and the company thus forfeits its entire invest-
ment.14
The procedure following a plaintiff’s successful resolution of her 
claim, be it through settlement or at trial, varies according to the 
structure of the agreement, which can fluctuate across the industry.  
Some lenders take a flat fee based on a percentage of the plaintiff’s 
recovery,15 but most charge interest rates that can be up to 15% 
monthly and can approach 200% annually when compounded.16  
These extraordinarily high rates are often justified by those in the liti-
gation finance industry as necessary to compensate for the significant 
risk they assume by advancing money on a nonrecourse basis.17
In order to combat negative attention accorded the litigation fi-
nance industry due to such high rates, and spurred by an investigation 
into the industry by then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer18—
who later reached an agreement with nine litigation finance organiza-
tions to institute certain reforms19—the American Litigation Finance 
Association (ALFA) was formed in March 2005.20  The first national 
trade association in the field of litigation finance, ALFA was formed by 
eleven member companies that agreed upon joining to abide by “best 
practices.”21  Its creation represented a significant step by the indus-
14 See Eileen Libby, Whose Lawsuit Is It?:  Ethics Opinions Express Mixed Attitudes About 
Litigation Funding Arrangements, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 36, 36 (explaining the basic 
structure of nonrecourse funding). 
15 Sniegocki, supra note 13, at 30. 
16 Carter, supra note 1, at 34. 
17 See Martin, supra note 3, at 66 (characterizing the justification for higher inter-
est rates as compensation for excessive risk); ALFA FAQs, supra note 11 (responding to 
a question about the high rates charged on advances against lawsuits by citing the 
greater amount of risk involved in addition to high transaction costs).  For information 
on the debate over how much risk is actually involved in these transactions, see infra 
note 85. 
18 See Dee McAree, Legal Cash-Advance Businesses Form Group, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 28, 
2005, at 4 (describing the causes behind ALFA’s formation). 
19 See Press Release, Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Personal Injury Cash 
Advance Firms Agree to Reforms (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
press/2005/feb/feb28a_05.html (listing reforms agreed to by participating companies, 
including “[c]lear and conspicuous disclosure statements,”  a “five-business-day right 
to cancel the contract without obligation or penalty,” and a “notarized acknowledg-
ment by the consumer’s attorney that the contract has been reviewed and explained to 
the client,” among others). 
20 See McAree, supra note 18, at 4 (reporting on the formation of ALFA). 
21 Id. 
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try—symbolically if not substantively—to self-regulate and improve its 
public image.22
A young field that, until recently, existed relatively unnoticed, liti-
gation finance has fallen under continuously increasing scrutiny and 
has incited debate over its virtues and vices and, accordingly, over how 
(or whether) it should be regulated.23
B.  Current Status:  In Legal Limbo 
This debate is further complicated by the states’ disparate treat-
ment of litigation finance, by an uncertainty concerning which exist-
ing legal doctrines are applicable, and by a general lack of modern 
law directly addressing the industry or analogous enterprises.24  In 
Florida, litigation finance cleared its first appellate level hurdle when 
a court reluctantly upheld the deal being challenged, reasoning that it 
did not have the authority to void the deal under state law.25  How-
ever, the court, recognizing the potential risks created by financial 
participation in litigation by parties otherwise extrinsic to the suit, 
suggested legislative intervention.26  Similarly, a New York court ex-
pressed frustration at being left no choice but to enforce a litigation 
finance contract due to the fact that “under New York law [litigation 
finance arrangements] are allowed as long as the primary purpose 
and intent of the assignment was for some reason other than bringing 
22 See id. (characterizing the member companies’ purpose of forming ALFA as “an 
attempt to raise standards and improve [the litigation finance industry’s] image”).  For 
other examples of the industry’s attempts to improve its reputation, see Martin, supra 
note 3, at 73 (“Litigation finance firms . . . are making attempts to institutionalize their 
industry, to improve their image by being more forthcoming on the rates they are 
charging, to keep those rates closer to credit card rates, and to become more involved 
in their communities.”); Cristina Merrill, Judgment Call:  Firms That Lend to Personal-
Injury Plaintiffs Take Steps To Improve Their Bad-Guy Image, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Jan. 27, 
2003, at 1 (describing support of the industry by the Association of Community Or-
ganizations for Reform Now, an “advocacy group for low-income New Yorkers”). 
23 See infra Part II for a detailed analysis of the debate over the positive and nega-
tive effects of the litigation finance industry, and see infra notes 180-184 and accompa-
nying text for a description of various proposals advanced for the industry’s regulation. 
24 See infra Part I.C for a review of these various doctrines and their application in 
certain states. 
25 See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(upholding agreement between plaintiff and litigation finance company due to a lack 
of Florida law regulating such agreements). 
26 See id. at 630 (“This court has no authority to regulate these agreements.  How-
ever, if the Florida Bar is going to allow lawyers to promote and provide such agree-
ments to their clients . . . the legislature might wish to examine this industry to deter-
mine whether Florida’s citizens are in need of any statutory protection.”). 
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suit on that assignment.”27  The court thus called for action by the state’s 
Attorney General.28
Courts in other states have approached litigation finance with 
greater hostility.  In North Carolina, a federal court awarded more 
than $500,000 to a law firm claiming that a litigation finance company 
interfered with the attorney-client relationship in one of the firm’s 
cases.29  In that case, two litigation finance companies and five indi-
viduals (including the aforementioned Perry Walton) were found li-
able for “wrongful interference with a contract and for unfair and de-
ceptive trade practices.”30  In Ohio, a surprising and oft-criticized 
decision declared litigation finance arrangements to be champertous 
and thus void under Ohio law.31
The ethical ramifications of litigation financing are similarly am-
biguous, and vary state by state.  Ethics opinions issued in Arizona, 
Florida, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia reflect 
the generally uncertain ethical status of litigation finance.32  These 
opinions alternately declare that litigation finance contracts violate 
the prohibition of fee splitting among attorneys and nonattorneys, 
permit attorneys to provide litigation finance companies with infor-
mation about a client’s case with the client’s consent, and enigmati-
cally allow an attorney to offer a client information about litigation fi-
nancing companies only when doing so is “in the client’s interests.”33
27 Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (emphasis added). 
28 Id. at *8 (“If the Attorney General was to formally legalize these arrangements 
by an ‘opinion letter’ rather than merely allow them to operate pursuant to an 
‘agreement’ . . . that would be appreciated by the court.”). 
29 Young, supra note 9, at 21. 
30 Id. at 22. 
31 See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 
2003) (holding contracts “making the repayment of funds advanced to a party to a 
pending case contingent upon the outcome of that case” void as champerty and main-
tenance); infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of the 
doctrine of champerty).  For a criticism of the court’s decision in Rancman, see Rich-
mond, supra note 6, at 658-60. 
32 See Libby, supra note 14, at 36 (providing an overview of how various state ethics 
committees have addressed litigation financing).  For further discussion of the ethical 
implications of litigation finance, see infra Part II.B. 
33 Libby, supra note 14, at 36. 
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C.  Related Legal Doctrines 
Several areas of the law currently are, or could potentially be, ap-
plied to the litigation finance industry—in particular, champerty pro-
hibitions, usury statutes, and certain elements of contract law.  Upon 
closer examination, however, it is evident that these laws materially 
predate contemporary business and legal practices, and are, therefore, 
less than ideal frameworks with which to analyze litigation finance. 
1.  Champerty 
The doctrine of champerty, which forbids “the sale of the fruit of 
legal judgment or settlement, in advance of such judgment or settle-
ment, to an otherwise disinterested party,”34 has deeply embedded his-
torical roots, dating back to ancient Greece and Rome.35  The ancient 
doctrine developed during the rise of Christianity, in part to categori-
cally deter even meritorious litigation.36  The doctrine of champerty 
continued to gain strength, and was incorporated into the common 
law during the Renaissance in opposition to the rise of capitalism.37  
Today, the cited policies justifying champerty prohibitions include 
discouraging frivolous litigation, diminishing resistance to settlement, 
reducing interference with the attorney-client relationship, and pre-
venting “strife, discord, and harassment.”38  In Rancman v. Interim Set-
tlement Funding Corp., a recent decision reviving the dormant prohibi-
tion of champerty in Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme Court eloquently 
and enthusiastically described the doctrine’s purpose as preventing 
“‘officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by 
vexatious and speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of 
34 Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work:  An Invitation to State Action, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (2002) (emphasis omitted).  For a useful survey of state 
champerty laws, see id. at 1333-41. 
35 See Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543 
(1996) (detailing the historical origins of champerty). 
36 Id. at 1544 (linking the general goal of discouraging litigation to the rise of 
Christianity and its accompanying encouragement of debt forgiveness). 
37 Id. at 1543. 
38 Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *7 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005); see Martin, supra note 3, at 57 (delineating various justifi-
cations offered in support of champerty prohibitions); Dobner, supra note 35, at 1546 
(same). 
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society, lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of 
the law.’”39
States diverge wildly in their definitions of and approaches to 
champerty.40  Some continue to recognize (or have resuscitated) the 
doctrine,41 citing the policies mentioned above as support.42  Con-
versely, others have eliminated the prohibition and therefore enforce 
champertous agreements,43 arguing that the champerty doctrine is in-
applicable to modern business44 and that other principles of law can 
more effectively achieve the doctrine’s goals.45  Many regard cham-
perty prohibitions as fossils—relics of an earlier age for which there 
truly are no contemporary justifications.46
The inconsistency of its form, substance, and application among 
states; its lack of relevance to modern business transactions; and the 
potential for its purposes to be served in other ways render the doc-
39 789 N.E.2d 217, 219-20 (Ohio 2003) (quoting 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Mainte-
nance § 3 (1991)). 
40 See Bond, supra note 34, at 1333-41 (surveying champerty laws in the fifty states); 
cf. id. at 1304 (“[C]onfusion reigns over what the doctrine of champerty is and to 
whom it applies.”).  Note that contingent fee arrangements are exceptions to the pro-
hibition of champerty.  Historically, champertors were attorneys.  Rancman, 789 N.E.2d 
at 220.  These practices are now regulated by MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.8(i).   
41 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he doctrine 
[of champerty] continues to have vitality in this State.”); Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220 
(acknowledging that while the doctrine of champerty has “in recent years . . . lain 
dormant in Ohio courts,” it is nevertheless still a part of the common law); id. at 221 
(holding a contract void as champerty). 
42 See, e.g., Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 220-21 (describing the disincentives to settle-
ment and tendencies to prolong litigation created by champertous agreements); id. at 
221 (“An intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation.”). 
43 See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997) (“We rule that the 
common law doctrines of champerty, barratry, and maintenance no longer shall be 
recognized in Massachusetts.”); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 
(S.C. 2000) (abolishing champerty as a defense in South Carolina); Martin, supra note 
3, at 57 (“New Jersey has always permitted and enforced champertous agreements.”); 
cf. id. at 58 (commenting that “other common law countries have increasingly been 
relaxing prohibitions on champerty”). 
44 See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *6 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“Champerty law was not written to deal with the situation 
that has developed from this modern form of business . . . .”). 
45 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 653 (“‘[O]ther well-developed principles of law 
can more effectively accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless law-
suits and the filing of frivolous suits’ than can these dated doctrines.” (quoting Osprey, 
Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 277)). 
46 See, e.g., Dobner, supra note 35, at 1545 (discussing changes that render “[t]he 
contemporary justification for laws against champerty and maintenance . . . far from 
obvious”). 
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trine of champerty in its current incarnation an unpromising vehicle 
for regulation of the litigation finance industry.47
2.  Usury 
Usury laws, which prohibit lending money at an unlawfully high 
interest rate,48 are akin to champerty prohibitions in their historical 
significance.  The first recorded version of a usury statute can be 
found in the 1750 B.C.E. Code of Hammurabi.49  Enacted to “protect 
vulnerable borrowers from predatory or unscrupulous lenders,”50 
usury laws have been criticized for their paternalism and for the im-
pediment they pose to people seeking to borrow money,51 as well as 
for their economic illogic.52
Although at first glance usury regulations appear to render most 
litigation finance contracts illegal,53 the law in most states likely con-
siders such contracts to be investments rather than loans due to their 
contingent nature, and litigation finance companies are therefore ex-
empt from compliance with statutory limits on interest rates.54  While 
47 In addition, some commentators note that refusing to enforce litigation finance 
contracts by invoking champerty prohibitions would result in a windfall for the plain-
tiff, who, without the contract, would presumably not have been able to pursue her 
case in the first place.  See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 812. 
48 See George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Indus-
try:  Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 753, 765 
n.102 (2003) (“Regulations that specify a maximum rate of interest that an institution 
can charge for lending money are known as usury laws.”); id. at 765 (noting that the 
term “usury” often is associated with “any level of interest felt to be unjust and unfair”). 
49 See Martin, supra note 3, at 58 (describing the historical background of usury 
laws). 
50 Richmond, supra note 6, at 665. 
51 See Swan, supra note 48, at 778 (describing one rationale of usury law as prevent-
ing “poor persons . . . from so overindulging themselves in debt”); id. at 768 (observing 
the irony that, while the purpose of usury law is to protect risky borrowers, “it is pre-
cisely these borrowers who are most hurt by usury laws,” in that “they are deprived of 
all credit facilities”). 
52 See id. at 778 (“Consistent with economic logic is the welcome of the litigation 
funding industry into a state’s marketplace.”); id. at 768 (noting that usury laws “create 
an artificial ‘shortage’ of credit” that results in a contrived and economically ineffi-
cient meting out of credit); id. at 769 (“On its face, usury law . . . is economically illogi-
cal.”). 
53 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (estimating the extremely high interest 
rates charged by litigation finance companies). 
54 See Martin, supra note 3, at 58-59 (generalizing that most states include an abso-
lute obligation for the borrower to repay as a necessary element of usury); Sniegocki, 
supra note 13, at 30 (“The critical distinction is the contingent nature of the transac-
tion.”).  The Rancman court explicitly avoided deciding whether the contract in ques-
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this theory has not yet been directly tested in court, under such an 
analysis, usury laws in their current form are simply inapplicable to 
nonrecourse funding arrangements. 
3.  Contract 
Traditional common law contract defenses such as duress and un-
conscionability could potentially be employed to make contracts be-
tween litigation finance companies and plaintiffs in civil suits ineffec-
tive in situations where the courts deem such relief appropriate.55  
However, due to the rather strict requirements for satisfying such doc-
trines,56 few courts have applied them to litigation finance as of yet. 
II.  DIVERGENT OPINIONS ABOUT LITIGATION FINANCE 
The recent expansion of the litigation finance industry57 and the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal environment in which it exists58 
have prompted an extensive dialogue about the industry’s value.  
Supporters praise the litigation finance industry for performing a 
necessary service by enabling those who might otherwise be excluded 
from the judicial process to pursue their days in court; detractors dis-
parage the industry for taking advantage of consumers and operating 
tion was a loan and thus subject to usury laws by voiding it on champerty grounds.  
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 2003) (“It 
is unnecessary for the resolution of this case to determine the threshold level of risk 
necessary for a contingent advance to be treated as an investment rather than a loan.  
The advances here are void as champerty and maintenance regardless of whether they 
are loans or investments.”).  But see Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 
2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“[I]t is ludicrous to consider this 
transaction anything else but a loan.”). 
55 See Bond, supra note 34, at 1307-08 (discussing how such doctrines have been 
used to accomplish the same policy goals as the prohibition of champerty). 
56 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the 
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”) (emphasis 
added); id. § 208 (“If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is 
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 208 
cmt. d (“A bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal 
in bargaining position . . . . Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscion-
ability . . . include . . . knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable 
reasonably to protect his interests.”). 
57 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (identifying dramatic growth in litiga-
tion finance). 
58 See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (depicting the unresolved legality 
of the industry). 
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in an ethical no-man’s land; and participants on both sides of the de-
bate cite the industry’s effect on settlement efforts as support for their 
respective positions. 
A.  Proponents 
Supporters of litigation finance argue that the industry performs 
an equalizing function by allotting plaintiffs the resources necessary to 
see their claims through to resolution and increase their credibility in 
pretrial negotiations.  This is a relevant concern, since a plaintiff ex-
periencing financial pressure has an incentive to accept a less-than-
reasonable settlement offer and may even have to abandon her case.  
While a contingent fee arrangement—whereby the attorney’s fee is 
only paid out of any judgment or settlement obtained—can relieve 
the plaintiff of the up-front cost of obtaining legal representation, she 
will still need the means to satisfy everyday expenses (and medical 
bills, if injured) while her claim pends.59  As support for this position, 
ALFA states that when “money quickly becomes tight and victims find 
it difficult to pay bills, purchase food and basic supplies, or keep their 
homes,” litigation finance “gives them the means they need to keep 
their families and lives intact while they await a complete and fair reso-
lution of their case.”60  Litigation finance is thus analogized to other 
forms of subprime lending, which “provide[] opportunities for low-
income borrowers to buy homes, cars and other goods by obtaining 
credit that is unavailable to them in the prime market.”61  A plaintiff 
unable to meet her financial needs by obtaining such “credit”—in this 
59 See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(“Grocery stores and home mortgage lenders do not wait for payment merely because 
a person is unable to work due to an automobile accident or other injury.”); Abraham, 
supra note 4, at 1301 (“Even with [a contingent fee] arrangement . . . potential plain-
tiffs are sometimes excluded due to the fact that an attorney who takes a lawsuit on a 
contingency fee basis does not ensure that sufficient funds will be available to carry the 
plaintiff’s claim to court.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 649-50 (recognizing that while 
the contingent fee system “address[es] attorney compensation issues,” it does not “help 
a plaintiff with the costs of daily living”). 
60 ALFA FAQs, supra note 11. 
61 Martin, supra note 3, at 66; see also Richmond, supra note 6, at 650 (acknowledg-
ing that “most traditional lenders are unwilling to lend money with only a potential 
litigation recovery as collateral because such loans are deemed to be too risky”); ALFA 
FAQs, supra note 11 (“Pending lawsuits are not assets that banks recognize when de-
termining an individual’s qualification for a loan.”). 
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case a cash advance from a litigation finance firm—may be forced to 
accept an unfair settlement offer or relinquish her claim.62
Viewed in this light, litigation finance companies are the white 
knights of the tort system, opening up the judicial process to the less 
fortunate and even evoking the noble principles of the American legal 
system,63 while those who seek to regulate or eliminate the industry 
are portrayed as heartlessly pro-big business and unsympathetic to in-
dividual plaintiffs.64
Industry proponents argue that, in addition to allowing greater 
access to the courts, litigation financing gives plaintiffs increased lev-
erage and bargaining power against typically large, wealthy defendant 
corporations with seemingly unlimited resources and time.65  Since 
otherwise, “[a] tort victim aiming at compensation from her tortfeasor 
is often in a very weak bargaining position,”66 a litigation finance ar-
rangement that relieves pressure on the plaintiff’s assets provides her 
with the ability to credibly threaten litigation and thus, ideally, reach a 
more favorable result.67
62 See, e.g., Libby, supra note 14, at 36 (“[A] plaintiff may feel so financially 
strapped by legal expenses along with the costs of dealing with the injury that he or she 
is willing to take a smaller amount in settlement rather go through the long wait for a 
day in court.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 649 (“[A] wealthy litigant, who can out-
spend a poorer litigant, is generally at an advantage and may be able to obtain a favor-
able settlement through attrition.”); George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation 
Funding Industry:  How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 819 
(2001) (“[T]he typical tortfeasor prefers to delay any settlement.”); Swan, supra note 
48, at 758 (“Nearly without exception, time favors a defendant. . . . Most plaintiffs settle 
because they are unable to wait the nearly two years elapsing before the average case 
comes to trial.”). 
63 See Carter, supra note 1, at 36 (“‘People who don’t like nonrecourse funding are 
really saying they don’t like our legal system.  Poor people often have to prematurely 
end litigation or settle for less because of the expense.’” (quoting Brooklyn Law School 
Professor Anthony J. Sebok)); see also Martin, supra note 3, at 68 (“It would be bad pol-
icy and unfair to poor plaintiffs with good cases to regulate litigation financing firms 
out of business.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 661 (positing that forbidding litigation 
funding would discourage some meritorious suits). 
64 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3, at 75 (“Discouraging litigation financing is but 
one more example of business defendants’ attempts to ‘reform’ tort law, that is, to rig 
the game so that plaintiffs have to forfeit before they have their full and fair day on the 
playing field.”). 
65 See id. at 77 (describing litigation finance as “leveling the playing field”); Snie-
gocki, supra note 13, at 29 (describing litigation finance as “bringing the scales of jus-
tice into balance”). 
66 Swan, supra note 62, at 819. 
67 See Dobner, supra note 35, at 1536-37 (summarizing the advantages of wealthier 
plaintiffs in the bargaining process). 
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Several other themes resonate among supporters of litigation fi-
nance.  One such theme is that the industry is economically benefi-
cial, since it “supports a tort system that deters negligence and en-
courages a corporate interest in safety”68 and thus serves the general 
welfare through its deterrent function.69  Some supporters liken litiga-
tion finance to the widely accepted contingent fee system and reason 
that it, likewise, should be welcomed into the mainstream.70  Others 
insist that the practice of litigation finance does not constitute preda-
tory lending since a potential client has her attorney to help her un-
derstand any agreement into which she may enter.71  There are also 
litigation finance proponents who defend the industry on freedom of 
contract grounds,72 argue that the industry’s legal troubles are caused 
by a discrete minority and are not widespread,73 and even submit that 
the industry is protected by the Constitution.74  An oft-reported suc-
cess story of litigation financing is the case of Abner Louima, a Haitian 
immigrant who won a widely publicized lawsuit against the New York 
68 Martin, supra note 3, at 77. 
69 See Swan, supra note 48, at 783 (arguing that the litigation finance industry “can 
fuel deterrence,” which in turn serves the general welfare). 
70 See Swan, supra note 62, at 823 (“Boosters of the litigation funding industry posit 
that it differs very little from the contingent fee arrangement whereby an attorney files 
suit in exchange for a claim against the damage award (or settlement).”); id. at 834 
(classifying the contingent fee structure as an “economic precedent” for litigation fi-
nancing); cf. Moliterno, supra note 5, at 246 (recognizing the positive effects of contin-
gent fees, which align the lawyer’s interests with her client’s, and recommending simi-
larly allowing a lawyer to provide her client with financial assistance).  But see Lester 
Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation:  Is It Price Competitive?, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 71 (2003) (“[C]ontingent fee lawyers charging standard contin-
gent fees are routinely overcharging some claimants because, in many instances, the 
representation involves no meaningful risk of no or low recovery and therefore the 
substantial risk premium in these instances yields unearned and unethical windfall 
fees . . . .”). 
71 See Martin, supra note 3, at 67 (arguing that litigation finance is not predatory in 
nature since “the lawyers [that borrowers] already have are going to be involved auto-
matically, and they will have an ethical obligation to provide advice to their clients 
about the financing”).  But see id. at 68 (“Nevertheless, merely having access to legal 
advice does not necessarily protect buyers from litigation financing firms that may be 
charging too much.”). 
72 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 659 n.68 (“‘The general rule of freedom of con-
tract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.’” (quoting Christeson v. Burba, 714 
S.W.2d 183, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986))). 
73 See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (citing the owner of a litigation firm as insisting 
that “the industry’s legal troubles have often been the fault of unscrupulous dealers 
and are not inherent to the industry”). 
74 See id. at 21 (describing the argument that the First Amendment, in protecting 
freedom of association, protects those who want to finance lawsuits). 
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City Police Department for police brutality, and turned to litigation 
finance for assistance in paying his living expenses.75
B.  Critics 
Critics of litigation finance, an industry dubbed the “‘Wild West of 
finance,’”76 warn of potential ethical violations associated with the 
practice.  They argue, for example, that litigation finance contracts 
can “create confusion concerning the party who actually owns and 
controls the lawsuit, and create risks that the attorney-client privilege 
will be waived unintentionally.”77  In the first scenario, the plaintiff’s 
lawyer may be affected in her judgment by a litigation finance entity 
attempting to protect its investment.78  In the second, a litigation fi-
nance company seeking information about a plaintiff’s case in order 
to decide whether to take her on as a client may obtain such informa-
tion from the plaintiff’s attorney in a way that violates confidentiality 
rules or forfeits the attorney-client privilege.79  Both of these scenarios 
invoke the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; an attorney counsel-
ing a client who enters into a litigation finance contract must be ex-
tremely vigilant to avoid violating the Rules.80  In addition to these 
tangible ethical concerns, there is also a general element of suspicion 
and skepticism that plagues litigation finance:  many courts and prac-
75 See Merrill, supra note 22, at 1 (detailing Louima’s use of litigation financing 
while awaiting his settlement).  Note, however, that Louima did not obtain any ad-
vance until after he had already settled his case; he entered into a litigation finance 
arrangement to cover living expenses while waiting to receive his $8.75 million settle-
ment.  Id. 
76 Martin, supra note 3, at 55 (quoting Michael Pollick, Business & Money:  Betting 
on the Verdict; Lawyers Advance Plaintiffs Money to Keep Lawsuits Going, in Hopes of Cashing 
in If a Suit Succeeds, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at D1). 
77 Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
78 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 651-52 (mentioning the potential for manipula-
tion of parties or attorneys by litigation financiers); Swan, supra note 62, at 831-32 (ac-
knowledging the risk that the existence of a litigation finance agreement could poten-
tially compromise an attorney’s independence). 
79 But see Richmond, supra note 6, at 652 (“Litigation funding companies do not, 
by their ordinary practices, create serious professional responsibility problems for at-
torneys.”). 
80 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) (laying out confidentiality 
rules); Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 806-09 (discussing how the Model Rules 
are implicated in litigation finance scenarios); Richmond, supra note 6, at 669-74 
(same).  Analogous provisions exist in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
the predecessor to the Model Rules, which is still followed by a small number of states.  
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983). 
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titioners are opposed to the industry due to its perceived unprincipled 
nature.81
A second major criticism of litigation finance is that it wrongfully 
takes advantage of consumers.  With some contracts calling for annual 
interest charges as high as 200% of the amount advanced,82 there is 
concern that the victim of an accident will be “further victimized” by a 
finance company charging such exorbitant rates.83  While these rates 
are frequently justified as appropriate in relation to the high risk of 
nonrecourse financing,84 there is disagreement over exactly how much 
risk is involved.85  Additionally, since litigation finance does not have 
the same structural protections as the prime lending market, which is 
heavily regulated and operates in an environment of healthy competi-
tion, critics worry that litigation financiers are able to target and swin-
dle vulnerable borrowers.86
Critics of litigation finance also express concern that the industry 
encourages frivolous claims.87  However, this argument is frequently 
rebutted by reasoning that it is in a litigation finance company’s best 
interest to advance money only to those plaintiffs who, in its determi-
81 See Martin, supra note 3, at 63 (describing the “emotional problems faced by the 
litigation financing industry,” namely, that “courts just do not like it”); see also Ranc-
man v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003)  (“[A] 
lawsuit is not an investment vehicle.”).  But see Dobner, supra note 35, at 1531 (“Litiga-
tion is an investment process.”). 
82 Carter, supra note 1, at 34; see also Carl Jones, Caveat Plaintiff Panel Says Legisla-
ture Should Consider Regulating Litigation Funding Companies, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., 
Sept. 20, 2005, at 1. 
83 Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
84 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219 (noting that “the appellants incurred virtu-
ally no risk in the transactions”); Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 
2005 WL 1083704, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (indicating that the case at bar 
was a “strict liability labor law case” where there was “low, if any risk”); see also Merrill, 
supra note 22, at 1 (describing how a particular litigation finance company “uses strict 
underwriting screening rules that ensure only about 4% of the cases it advances money 
on are lost in court,” by using a strategy of targeting “cases in the midresolution 
stage”). 
86 See Liptak, supra note 7 (mentioning the argument that litigation financiers 
“exploit vulnerable people”); Martin, supra note 3, at 64 (commenting on the general 
lack of predatory lending in the mainstream market); see also Melissa Nann Burke, 
Companies That Fund Lawsuits Organize, Set Standards, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Mar. 
31, 2005, at 11 (noting that the structure of the litigation finance industry and its lack 
of interest rate reporting requirements “makes it difficult for consumers to shop 
around”). 
87 See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the concern that litigation financiers 
“will become Goliaths who can bankroll frivolous lawsuits against more vulnerable de-
fendants”). 
  
2006] IT’S ABOUT TIME 519 
 
nation, have a reasonable chance of succeeding, since its investment 
will otherwise be for naught.88  The “promotes frivolous litigation” ar-
gument is further weakened by the fact that litigation finance agree-
ments are entered into after the plaintiff has decided to pursue her 
claim and has retained an attorney; as such, litigation finance compa-
nies simply become involved with current litigation and do not en-
courage new claims.89  Furthermore, while it is conceivable that the 
mere knowledge that a litigation finance company could potentially 
provide funding at a later date may encourage a plaintiff to sue, the 
fact remains that the industry receives much of its business through 
attorney referrals90 and likely is not recognized enough among the 
general public to cause any significant increase in the number of frivo-
lous claims. 
A corollary to the “promotes frivolous litigation” criticism of litiga-
tion finance stems from the observation that the industry creates an 
increase in the amount of litigation overall (whether frivolous or not) 
by granting prospective plaintiffs access to the system that they would 
not otherwise have had.  In doing so, litigation finance may overdeter 
risky activities from which the market, and society as a whole, could 
benefit.91
C.  Settlement 
Both supporters and critics of litigation finance invoke the indus-
try’s effect on the settlement of claims as support for their particular 
positions.  Indeed, settlement is a vital part of the American justice sys-
tem, as most disputes that come to the courts are resolved by means 
other than trial—in fact, less than ten percent of cases are tried.92  
88 See Martin, supra note 3, at 77 (“No one is going to invest in a frivolous lawsuit 
because any money thus invested will be lost.”); Richmond, supra note 6, at 660-61 
(disputing the concern that litigation financing will result in frivolous litigation by not-
ing the lack of incentive for a company to advance money in an unfounded case). 
89 See Carter, supra note 1, at 36 (quoting Cardozo Law School Professor Lester 
Brickman as asserting that litigation finance companies “come in after the lawyer, so it 
has nothing to do with frivolous litigation”).  According to this line of reasoning, litiga-
tion finance does not catalyze the origination of claims; however, it conceivably affects 
decisions concerning whether or not to continue the claim or accept a settlement.  See 
infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (outlining the negative effects of litigation 
finance arrangements on settlement efforts). 
90 ALFA FAQs, supra note 11. 
91 See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (recognizing the possibility of overdeterrence). 
92 Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:”  Judicial Mediation in the 
United States, 12 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (1985). 
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This proliferation of settlement activity is owed to various factors, in-
cluding revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly in-
cluding settlement as a purpose of the pretrial conference,93 judges’ 
increasing inclination to actively encourage and participate in settle-
ment negotiations, and a recognition of the administrative conven-
ience and arguably superior results achieved by the resolution of 
claims by settlement.94  A general rise in alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR), of which settlement is a subset, coincides with and is attrib-
uted to the high costs of conventional civil litigation and the pro-
longed uncertainty created by both the wait until trial and the poten-
tially ensuing appellate process, among other factors.95
Settlement is preferable for several reasons, both economic and 
substantive.  Analyzed economically, trials are viewed as failures, since 
“[t]he longer play continues, the less the participants’ aggregate 
wealth because they must expend on litigation money they could save 
by settling.”96  Encouraging settlement preserves scarce judicial re-
sources for only the most deserving cases.97  In addition, courts that 
promote settlement should be able to allocate resources in such a way 
that they can handle a larger number of cases and operate more effi-
ciently.98  The costs reduced by settlement are not just monetary, 
though; they also include, among others, the emotional cost of stress 
related to impending trials and lengthy disputes as well as the oppor-
tunity cost of what is forsaken by devoting time to preparing for and 
attending trial.99
93 Id. at 7.  Similar rules exist at the state level.  See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 1210; DEL. SU-
PER. CT. R. 16; N.Y. R. CT. 202.12 (specifically listing settlement as a matter for consid-
eration at a pretrial conference). 
94 See id. Galanter, supra note 92, at 2-3 (discussing various reasons for the increase 
in settlement activity). 
95 See Erika S. Fine & Elizabeth S. Plapinger, ADR Overview, in CONTAINING LEGAL 
COSTS:  ADR STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATIONS, LAW FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 7, 7 
(Erika S. Fine ed., 1988) (explaining the reasons for the growth of ADR). 
96 Samuel Issacharoff et al., Bargaining Impediments and Settlement Behavior, in DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION:  BRIDGING THE SETTLEMENT GAP 51-52 (David A. Anderson ed., 
1996) (citations omitted); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and 
the Trial/Settlement Decision, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 17, 17 (“Economic mod-
els of litigation often view trial as a costly failure to achieve a mutually beneficial set-
tlement.”). 
97 See Galanter, supra note 92, at 2 (describing justifications for settlement). 
98 See id. at 8 (presenting the prosettlement argument that “courts that promote 
settlements will as a result handle more cases”). 
99 See WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT:  A HANDBOOK 
FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 2-3 (1988) (enumerating the various costs lessened by set-
tlement). 
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In substantive terms, settlement is advocated as a “higher quality 
of justice” with increased fulfillment enjoyed among participants.100  
Because of the unavoidable uncertainty of a jury trial, the resulting 
verdict may be universally regarded as inappropriate.101  Settlement, 
however, offers the opportunity to customize case resolution to the 
participants’ various needs, and may therefore result in “greater party 
satisfaction and enforcement reliability” due to its collaborative, 
rather than winner-take-all, nature.102  Furthermore, settlements in-
volving active participation by judges may be even more successful 
than those without such participation.103
The view that settlement is preferable to trial, however, is certainly 
not unanimous.  On one hand, trials are beneficial because they edu-
cate the public,104 and the shift to the largely private process of settle-
ment dampens public debate and decreases the general public’s ac-
cess to the legal system.105  Additionally, the focus on settlement as a 
way to maximize efficiency in the courts may come at the steep price 
of equal justice.106  In spite of these concerns, however, settlement is 
embraced by the modern civil court system due to its optimization of 
economic efficiency and, arguably, of substantive results, and is thus 
often encouraged as a preferred alternative to trial. 
100 Galanter, supra note 92, at 3 (quoting an outline distributed to new federal 
judges at a training session, as explaining that “‘[i]n most controversies, most court 
cases, the highest quality of justice is not the all or nothing, black or white end result of 
a trial but is in the grey area—in most cases a freely negotiated settlement is a higher 
quality of justice’”). 
101 See id. at 2 (“[A] trial might lead to results that are unacceptably harsh or ca-
lamitous . . . .”). 
102 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement:  Uses and Abuses of the Manda-
tory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985). 
103 See Galanter, supra note 92, at 8 (setting forth the argument that “judicial pro-
motion of settlements will result in outcomes that are superior to those that would oc-
cur in its absence,” but noting that additional empirical evidence is needed to support 
this claim). 
104 See Issacharoff et al., supra note 96, at 68 (discussing, as a benefit of trial and 
thus a drawback of settlement, the fact that trials “can be a source of education and 
information about law to the public” and “can provide an opportunity to vindicate 
public goals”). 
105 See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:  Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 999-1000 (lamenting the increase in settlement and 
its negative effect on public involvement in and connection with the judicial process). 
106 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075-76 (1984) (describ-
ing the potential of settlement to be coercive, especially when the parties are of dispa-
rate wealth). 
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Litigation finance is regarded by many as an obstacle to settle-
ment.  A rational plaintiff will not settle for any amount offered by the 
defendant that is less than the aggregate of the principal amount ad-
vanced to her and the current interest accrued, which is often im-
mense due to the staggering rates charged by many litigation finance 
companies.107  This artificially inflated minimum acceptable offer and 
the nonrecourse character of the arrangement will lead the rational 
plaintiff to reject otherwise reasonable settlement offers, since, if she 
loses at trial, she will owe nothing.108  In this way, litigation finance 
gives plaintiffs disincentives to settle and instead encourages disputes 
to progress to trial.109
An opposing view posits that litigation financing actually encour-
ages settlement, or at least more just settlement.110  Since entering into 
a litigation finance contract presumably gives the plaintiff the re-
sources and “threat credibility” to carry her claim to trial, litigation fi-
nancing may draw an otherwise obstinate defendant to the bargaining 
table and result in a fairer settlement award.111  Additionally, the in-
terest on the advance, which accrues while the case is pending, creates 
an added incentive for the plaintiff to settle (and to do so as soon as 
107 See, e.g., Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220-21 
(Ohio 2003) (providing an example of how a plaintiff’s settlement options were af-
fected by her litigation finance arrangement). 
108 See Young, supra note 9, at 21 (“[A] plaintiff bankrolled by a lender has an in-
centive to reject modest, but reasonable, settlement offers.  At worst, she risks a total 
loss in the courts, in which case she owes nothing and can even keep the amount ad-
vanced.”). 
109 See Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221 (listing its impediment of settlement as a rea-
son for declaring a litigation finance contract void as champerty); Swan, supra note 48, 
at 779 (presenting the view that the nonrecourse nature of litigation financing pro-
vides plaintiffs an incentive to go to trial, because “[i]f they settle most of the money 
will go to their lawyers and the litigation funding companies” (quotation marks omit-
ted)).  ALFA notes that its members have agreed to fund at most ten percent of the 
estimated net value of any case so as not to “disincentivize the client from settling the 
case.”  ALFA FAQs, supra note 11. 
110 See Richmond, supra note 6, at 661 (“The law favors fair and just settlements, 
not unfair or unjust settlements brought about by a party’s economic despera-
tion . . . .”). 
111 See Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 1, at 811 (positing that litigation financing 
gives a plaintiff “threat credibility,” in that a defendant cannot ignore the threat of liti-
gation by a plaintiff with sufficient resources to litigate); Richmond, supra note 6, at 
661 (noting that litigation finance “may even promote settlement . . . by forcing a re-
calcitrant defendant to approach a case reasonably and pragmatically in light of the 
fact that its adversary has the resources to meaningfully prosecute the matter”). 
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possible) so as to avoid accumulating continuously higher debts.112  
Finally, an advance that lessens the pressure on the plaintiff to meet 
her immediate financial commitments likewise reduces the temporal 
burden on her attorney, who will have more time to prepare the case 
and negotiate the most favorable settlement offer possible.113  Despite 
these arguments advanced by those who believe litigation finance en-
courages settlement, the reality nonetheless remains that a plaintiff 
who owes a consequential debt (which may be significantly higher 
than the objective value of her claim) will not be inclined to accept a 
settlement offer lower than such an amount. 
After considering both sides of the debate, it is clear that while 
litigation finance satisfies a heretofore unfulfilled need by giving 
plaintiffs the resources necessary to pursue their claims and increase 
their bargaining power, some measure of reform that ensures con-
sumer protection and the effectiveness of the settlement process must 
be instituted to prevent the industry from flourishing at the high cost 
of equity.114  The principles of systems thinking, set forth below, offer 
unique insight into how such reform might best be framed. 
III.  SYSTEMS THINKING 
A.  Systems Thinking Explained 
Systems thinking is an amalgam of a discipline loosely defined as 
the study of “how a number of different things act together when ex-
112 See Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005) (“[T]he interest on the advance, obviously of sizeable na-
ture . . . creates an added incentive to settle . . . .”). 
113 See Sniegocki, supra note 13, at 29-30 (“[A] cash advance . . . allows [the plain-
tiff’s] attorney time to prepare the case and negotiate a just and adequate settle-
ment.”). 
114 As Susan Lorde Martin notes: 
There is little doubt that a litigation financing industry that acts professionally 
and ethically in attempting to earn a reasonable return for the risk it is under-
taking, fills a need that has not been served by more traditional lenders.  The 
industry can be improved by some regulation, but it would be unfortunate if 
the entire industry became the victim of a political movement of so-called tort 
reform that dwells on the outlier cases in which plaintiffs receive unwarranted 
windfalls but ignores the much more numerous situations where fairness and 
justice are absent because meritorious plaintiffs do not have the funds to sus-
tain routine expenses as well as medical costs during the years that it may take 
to bring their cases to a final conclusion. 
Martin, supra note 3, at 74. 
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posed to a number of different influences at the same time”115 and 
colloquially explained by the maxim “the whole is more than the sum 
of its parts.”116  It gained popularity among mainstream academics in 
the 1970s and 80s, although a survey of history shows its presence 
much earlier in time.117  Systems thinking has its roots amidst a mod-
ern scientific revolution, in which the Newtonian, mechanistic view of 
the world as “an exquisitely designed giant mechanism” divisible into 
discrete parts gave way to a “science of organized complexity,” with 
the so-called “new scientist” focusing on “relationships and situations” 
rather than on “atomistic facts and events.”118  As such, the systems 
view treats things as “integrated wholes of their subsidiary components 
and never as the mechanistic aggregate of parts in isolable causal rela-
tions.”119
115 ERVIN LASZLO, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF THE WORLD 5 (1972).  This Comment 
seeks to apply theoretically the general, overarching principles of systems thinking to 
the field of litigation finance; it does not attempt to engage in detailed empirical 
analysis or modeling. 
116 NIC J.T.A. KRAMER & JACOB DE SMIT, SYSTEMS THINKING:  CONCEPTS AND NO-
TIONS 3 (H.E. Stenfert Kroese B.V. trans., 1977); see also PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH 
DISCIPLINE:  THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 68 (1990) (de-
scribing systems thinking as “a discipline for seeing wholes . . . a framework for seeing 
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static 
‘snapshots’”). 
117 See JAMES E. HERGET, CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 73 (1996) 
(citing historical examples of systems thinking, including “Adam Smith’s eighteenth-
century view of the economy” in which “individual human beings separately pursuing 
their personal economic goals . . . gave rise to a ‘system’ in which the distribution of 
goods and services was arranged for everyone’s benefit”). 
118 LASZLO, supra note 115, at 11-13; see id. at 3 (“Until very recently, contemporary 
Western science was shaped by a mode of thinking which placed rigorous detailed 
knowledge above all other considerations.”); MARGARET J. WHEATLEY, LEADERSHIP AND 
THE NEW SCIENCE:  LEARNING ABOUT ORGANIZATION FROM AN ORDERLY UNIVERSE 9 
(1992) (“The Newtonian model of the world is characterized by . . . a focus on things 
rather than relationships . . . . In new science, the underlying currents are a movement 
toward holism, toward understanding the system as a system and giving primary value 
to the relationships that exist among seemingly discrete parts.”).  For a general ac-
count of changes in scientific thought throughout history, see PETER CHECKLAND, SYS-
TEMS THINKING, SYSTEMS PRACTICE 36-50 (1981). 
119 LASZLO, supra note 115, at 14-15.  The systems literature often illustrates its ho-
listic orientation by pointing to the human body as an example: 
Living systems are organized in such a way that they form multi-leveled struc-
tures, each level consisting of subsystems which are wholes in regard to their 
parts, and parts with respect to the larger wholes.  Thus molecules combine to 
form organelles, which in turn combine to form cells.  The cells form tissues 
and organs, which themselves form larger systems, like the digestive system or 
the nervous system.  These, finally, combine to form the living woman or 
man . . . . People form families, tribes, societies, nations. 
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A radical departure from the way most of us approach the 
world,120 systems thinking encourages a new way of analyzing prob-
lems; in fact, it even suggests a new way of determining what is (or is 
not) a problem in the first place.121  This paradigm shift122 entails vari-
ous overarching principles of how to conduct analysis as a systems 
thinker, in particular approaching problems as subsets of their larger 
environments rather than in isolation; rejecting a linear, “either-or” 
view of the world, instead recognizing its inevitable complexity and in-
terrelation;123 and acknowledging that seemingly small events or 
changes can cause extreme outcomes.124
Systems thinking has been applied to many disciplines, enjoying 
especially warm reception in management scholarship, where systems 
thinkers have recommended that businesses adopt a fluid leadership 
structure instead of adhering to traditional models of hierarchical 
management.125  Other applications in the management context have 
emphasized the importance of embracing the inevitability and positiv-
ity of change, including all stakeholders in management and decision-
making processes, creating working groups and networks instead of 
formalized standing committees,126 and balancing work with family 
FRITJOF CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT:  SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE RISING CULTURE 43 
(1982). 
120 See SENGE, supra note 116, at 3 (“From a very early age, we are taught to break 
apart problems, to fragment the world.”). 
121 See, e.g., WHEATLEY, supra note 118, at 20-21 (observing that “disorder can be a 
source of order,” and that “if we look at [a chaotic] system long enough and with the 
perspective of time, it always demonstrates its inherent orderliness”). 
122 See T. IRENE SANDERS, STRATEGIC THINKING AND THE NEW SCIENCE:  PLANNING 
IN THE MIDST OF CHAOS, COMPLEXITY, AND CHANGE 144-46 (1998) (citing examples of 
paradigm shifts and explaining that a paradigm shift “proposes new questions, rede-
fines old questions, and opens the door for further exploration, discovery, and ex-
perimentation”). 
123 See id. at 65 (noting that “most of the world is made up of nonlinear systems”); id. at 
147 (advocating a shift from linear to nonlinear, from separateness to relatedness). 
124 See id. at 57-61 (describing the “Butterfly Effect,” in which a butterfly flapping 
its wings in Asia causes a hurricane in the Atlantic, as a metaphor for how “small 
changes or events create complex results”); SENGE, supra note 116, at 64 (“[S]mall, 
well-focused actions can sometimes produce significant, enduring improve-
ments . . . .”). 
125 See, e.g., WHEATLEY, supra note 118, at 22-23 (describing informal leadership 
and its responsiveness to change, and stating that “[i]f organizations are machines, 
control makes sense [and i]f organizations are process structures, then seeking to im-
pose control through permanent structure is suicide”). 
126 See SANDERS, supra note 122, at 136, 147-50 (listing systems thinking’s applica-
tions to business management). 
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life.127  Systems thinking in one form or another has also been used to 
analyze foreign policy initiatives,128 the public’s concern with current 
events,129 and negotiation techniques.130
Despite such developments in other disciplines, the application of 
systems thinking to law has been comparatively limited.131  Niklas 
Luhmann, a German scholar who has done much of the theoretical 
systems analysis in the field, defines law as “a social system of commu-
nication that serves to secure normative expectations.”132  The law is 
an “autopoietic,” or self-maintaining and self-renewing, system be-
cause “[l]aw comes out of law” and “absorbs change” “as the system 
receives stimuli from its environment and as the law reflects upon it-
self.”133  Thus, viewed systemically, the law is a living, breathing organ-
ism constantly in flux. 
Because of the realistic view it counsels of the legal system as a 
complex and ever-changing entity (particularly when performing its 
conflict resolution function134), systems thinking is a useful way to ana-
lyze litigation finance and to approach the decision that courts and 
state legislatures now face concerning whether the industry should be 
127 See SENGE, supra note 116, at 307 (“Traditional organizations undeniably foster 
conflict between work and family . . . the artificial boundary between work and family 
is anathema to systems thinking.”). 
128 See, e.g., id. at 59 (noting the failure of certain food assistance programs in de-
veloping countries because of compensating feedback, whereby the aid, albeit well-
intentioned, has systemic effects resulting in a worsening of the problem). 
129 See, e.g., SANDERS, supra note 122, at 75 (describing “strange attractors,” or 
events that “quickly give visibility to unrecognized initial conditions,” such as the Cla-
rence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings shedding light on sexual harassment and the O.J. 
Simpson trial creating public concern about the role of wealth in judicial proceed-
ings). 
130 See, e.g., PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE:  DEVELOP-
ING MORAL COURAGE IN RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS 178-81 (2d ed. 2002) (advocating 
a paradigm shift in the approach to negotiations involving unequal bargaining power). 
131 For examples of how systems thinking has been used in legal scholarship, see 
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts:  A Philosophy of Complex Business Transac-
tions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1077, 1091 (2005) (applying systems thinking to complex con-
tractual transactions); Larry I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law, 36 
HOUS. L. REV. 1609, 1637 (1999) (relating systems thinking to health care law). 
132 HERGET, supra note 117, at 75. 
133 Id. at 77-78. 
134 On the complex, systemic nature of conflict resolution, see Issacharoff et al., 
supra note 96, at 72 (“There are inherent difficulties in the resolution of conflict in a 
world of complicated interactions, counterposing interests, and fragmented control of 
decisions.  That is the world we live in, a world in which intricate social, commercial, 
and legal relations undergird everyday conduct and influence the conduct of many 
disputes.”). 
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“left alone, regulated to some extent, or regulated out of business.”135  
Many of the proposals seeking to reform litigation finance advanced 
thus far have involved narrowly targeted, mechanistic changes to the 
law that, standing alone, do not account for their potential effects on 
the legal system and society as a whole or address anything more than 
the surface of litigation finance’s negative effects.136  A systems think-
ing analysis, in contrast, suggests the implementation of highly lever-
aged change137 that would shift the very position litigation finance oc-
cupies in the civil justice arena. 
B.  Proposal:  Reduce Time Delay 
Taking into account the principles of systems thinking, reducing 
the time between when a claim originates and when it is resolved is an 
advantageous way to address the consumer protection and settlement-
obstruction concerns about litigation finance138 without overregulat-
ing the industry and thus depriving a sector of the American public of 
court access or the opportunity for elevated bargaining power.139  With 
delays in the civil justice system omnipresent,140 and often favoring the 
usually wealthier defendant,141 a reduction in time delay would ad-
dress the underlying issues that induce a plaintiff to enter a litigation 
finance contract in the first place.  When such a contract is formed, a 
shorter period until disposition of the claim would reduce the amount 
of time that interest accrues and any accompanying disincentive to 
settle.  This solution nonetheless allows the industry to enjoy continu-
ity of existence without heavy-handed interference. 
135 Martin, supra note 3, at 56. 
136 See infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text (listing proposals). 
137 See SENGE, supra note 116, at 114 (defining the principle of leverage as making 
changes consistent with the “economy of means” that “lead to significant, enduring 
improvements”). 
138 See supra Parts II.B.-C (detailing concerns of industry critics). 
139 See supra Part II.A (describing the positive effects of litigation finance). 
140 See ABA DIV. FOR JUDICIAL SERVS., DEFEATING DELAY:  DEVELOPING AND IMPLE-
MENTING A COURT DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAM 6-7 (1986) [hereinafter DEFEATING 
DELAY] (“In most jurisdictions, delay . . . is the norm.”); Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?:  
An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814-15 
(2000) (discussing the length of time for civil cases to reach disposition by trial, and 
noting that the Sixth Amendment right to a “speedy trial” applies only to criminal 
cases). 
141 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (comparing the typical financial posi-
tions of plaintiffs and defendants). 
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Delay is an element indigenous to many systems, and one that can 
have significant implications unless recognized and accounted for.  
Consider the widespread existence of delay in daily personal and 
business situations:  the time between eating a meal and feeling full, 
adjusting the shower faucet and sensing the change in temperature, 
and ordering new inventory and having it on hand to sell to custom-
ers.142  An especially enlightening exercise, frequently used in business 
classes, requires participants to simulate managing inventory through 
a supply chain.143  Participants are organized into teams of four, with 
one person each representing the factory, distributor, wholesaler, and 
retailer; consumer demand is determined at random by a deck of 
cards.144  Because most do not understand the effects of the time de-
lays inherent to the process or the effects of fluctuating demand on 
the entirety of the supply chain, the hypothetical average costs among 
first-time participants are ten times greater than optimal.145
In the litigation context, delay is not only of practical concern, as 
it results in a decrease in evidentiary quality and witness availability, 
but also of social concern, as it is cost prohibitive and threatens the 
credibility of the justice system.146  It is thus evident that time delay can 
introduce problems into the systems it pervades, and accordingly, 
“‘[o]ne of the highest leverage points for improving system perform-
142 See SENGE, supra note 116, at 89-92 (providing examples of time delay). 
143 See e.g., JOHN D. STERMAN, BUSINESS DYNAMICS:  SYSTEMS THINKING AND MODEL-
ING FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 684-94 (2000) (describing the “Beer Distribution Game” 
and its illustration of how delay creates inefficient, choleric systems characterized by 
severe oscillation—in this case, extremely large orders of inventory during periods of 
high demand followed by orders of zero once participants realize they are over-
stocked). 
144 Id. at 684. 
145 Id. at 686. 
146 As Michael Heise notes: 
Prolonged case disposition time frequently correlates with an increase in liti-
gation costs and threatens evidentiary quality as memories fade, evidence 
spoils, and witnesses and litigants die.  Delays in the resolution of civil disputes 
erode public confidence in the civil justice system, disappoint and frustrate 
those seeking compensation through the legal system, and generate benefits 
for those with the financial ability to withstand delays or otherwise benefit 
from them.  Such factors, individually and collectively, undermine public faith 
and confidence in the ability of our civil justice system to operate efficiently 
and, more importantly, equitably. 
Heise, supra note 140, at 814-15.  Note also the effects of delay on the amount at stake.  
Any amount expected to be received in the future must be discounted to its present 
value, which will be substantially less.  See generally George Priest, The Simple Economics of 
Civil Procedure, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 389, 392-93 (2000) (explaining the impact of 
delay on financial awards). 
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ance . . . is the minimization of system delays.’”147  Viewing reduction 
in delay as a manifestation of the leverage principle, which counsels 
that “the best results come not from large-scale efforts but from small 
well-focused actions,”148 suggests that reducing the time that a civil 
claim is pending is a less intrusive and more promising alternative to 
other possible litigation finance reforms. 
Faster disposition of claims would reduce the gap between a plain-
tiff’s assets and her financial needs, since as each month arrives, so do 
another rent or mortgage payment and slew of additional bills.  Re-
solving claims more quickly would alter the way the system works by 
reducing the pressure on plaintiffs to continuously muster additional 
resources in order to see their claims through to completion.  In this 
way, plaintiffs would have to turn to litigation financiers less often and 
for smaller amounts. 
A reduction in time delay would also address the concerns of 
those stakeholders who emphatically support the litigation finance in-
dustry for providing a necessary service to people who might otherwise 
not be able to pursue justice,149 in addition to addressing the concerns 
of those who advocate a free-market approach to legal claims.150  As a 
practical matter, no reduction in delay could completely eliminate the 
disparity between every plaintiff’s resources and needs; there will al-
ways be certain plaintiffs who simply cannot stretch their limited 
means over the length of their litigation.  However, a briefer disposi-
tion time would confine the litigation finance industry to the clients 
who most need its services and thus mitigate its impact on the civil 
litigation process.  By allowing the industry to survive and instead ad-
justing the larger environment within which it operates, the proposed 
approach would preserve the benefits of litigation finance.151
When a plaintiff does employ the services of a litigation financier, a 
reduction in time delay would likewise reduce her aggregate amount 
owed, as there would be a generally smaller amount borrowed as well 
147 SENGE, supra note 116, at 89 (quoting Ray Stata, CEO of Analog Devices). 
148 Id. at 114. 
149 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (advancing the argument that liti-
gation finance increases court access). 
150 See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 
12 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 443 (advocating a “market for the sale and exchange of tort 
claims”); Swan, supra note 62, at 817 (“Competitive exchange affords a promising rem-
edy for inefficient tort laws.”). 
151 See Martin, supra note 3, at 68 (“It would be bad policy and unfair to poor 
plaintiffs with good cases to regulate litigation financing firms out of business.”). 
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as less time for interest to accumulate and compound.  A faster dispo-
sition thereby should appease, at least to some extent, consumer pro-
tection advocates who condemn the usually extreme differential be-
tween the amount a plaintiff receives as an advance and the amount 
she owes following resolution of her claim.152
The existence of a nonrecourse litigation financing arrangement 
has serious implications for the settlement process, often causing 
plaintiffs to refuse to settle for an objectively reasonable amount and 
thus forcing an inflated number of cases to trial.  As discussed above, 
this results in increased costs and inefficiencies in the court system.153  
A reduction in disposition time would lessen, or perhaps even elimi-
nate, the impediments to settlement, since interest would not have as 
much time to accrue, and the plaintiff would thus owe a more reason-
able total amount.  The simultaneous reduction in accumulation of 
living expenses would address the problem of a plaintiff feeling com-
pelled to accept an unreasonably low settlement offer just to make 
ends meet.154  In an archetypal example of systemic interrelation, just 
as a reduction in time delay encourages settlement, settlement in turn 
results in quicker disposition of cases.155
There are numerous ways a reduction in time delay could be im-
plemented in the civil court system.  Process-oriented156 changes, such 
as the institution of efficient caseflow-management systems,157 firm en-
forcement of scheduling policies,158 and a flexible allowance for the 
incorporation of additional adjudicators159 are practical ways to lessen 
the burden of delay on the courts.  More drastically, some have advo-
cated a shift from the traditional civil jury trial paradigm to increased 
reliance on other methods of case disposition, including more fre-
152 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (detailing consumer protection 
concerns). 
153 See supra Part II.C (indicating how settlement is affected by nonrecourse ar-
rangements). 
154 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (identifying financial pressures on 
plaintiffs). 
155 See Heise, supra note 140, at 816.  
156 See id. at 816 (characterizing particular delay-reduction techniques as “process-
oriented” rather than structural). 
157 See DEFEATING DELAY, supra note 140, at 42 (discussing various permutations of 
case assignment systems designed to reduce delays). 
158 See id. at 43 (explaining administrative approaches to delay reduction, such as 
firm-continuance policies and date-certain scheduling). 
159 See id. at 43-44 (recommending the use of retired and visiting judges, when 
necessary, to relieve court congestion). 
  
2006] IT’S ABOUT TIME 531 
 
quent use of bench trials160 and the “short trial.”161  In addition to the 
reduction in time delay that bench trials offer due to their exclusion 
of potentially lengthy undertakings such as jury selection, an increase 
in bench trials is positively correlated with increased settlement rates, 
and, “[t]ypically, case disposition times for cases that settle are less 
than that for those cases that reach full trial.”162  Admittedly, the Sev-
enth Amendment right to a jury trial in federal court and correspond-
ing rights at the state level limit the feasibility of drastically increasing 
bench trials.  However, the suggestion nonetheless remains as a po-
tential step toward reducing time delay in the court system in certain 
cases. 
Another innovative time-saving technique is the experimental use 
of “short trials,” one-day trials decided by a four-person jury.163  Jurors 
are given a notebook containing the evidence relevant to their case; 
they then have the opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses.164  
Three of the four jury members must agree on the verdict, which is 
binding.165   
Many of these delay-reduction approaches, which can conceivably 
be varied and expanded upon in any number of ways, have been im-
plemented with success in certain state court systems.  For example, 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas has garnered accolades for 
recent changes that have increased efficiency and reduced delay166 
and that provide a potential model for other courts to follow.  In 
1992, there was a backlog of over 28,000 civil cases in the Court of 
Common Pleas; now, ninety percent of lawsuits are cleared in two 
years or less.167  The changes instrumental in bringing about such 
160 See Heise, supra note 140, at 815 (setting forth a delay-reduction strategy of in-
creased reliance on bench trials). 
161 G. Thomas Munsterman, A Cost Free Civil Jury Trial?, 18 CT. MANAGER 35, 35-36 
(2003). 
162 Heise, supra note 140, at 816.  But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:  Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 
1173-74 (1992) (noting the existence of selection bias between judge and jury trials). 
163 See Munsterman, supra note 161, at 35-36. 
164 Id. 
165 Id.  The short trial has been particularly popular in Maricopa County, Arizona 
and Clark County, Nevada.  Id. 
166 See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROGRAMS IN THE PHILADELPHIA 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FINAL REPORT 58 (Sept. 2004) (describing the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas as “arguably the best-managed large urban civil trial court op-
eration in the nation”); L. Stuart Ditzen, Civil Courts in City Hailed as a Model, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Nov. 27, 2004, at A1 (summarizing changes in the Philadelphia courts). 
167 Ditzen, supra note 166, at A1. 
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radical improvement include the institution of a commerce court to 
specialize in disputes among businesses and a complex litigation cen-
ter to handle mass tort cases;168 the placement of all incoming cases on 
case-management tracks with strict deadlines; and the creation of a 
“Day Backward” and a “Day Forward” program whereby judges are as-
signed to teams organized by case year, with each team led by a “team 
leader.”169  These changes have been met with praise not only from 
outside analysts, but also from trial lawyers, who appreciate the cer-
tainty accorded by “the firmness of trial dates . . . and the quick dispo-
sition of cases.”170
Similarly, initiatives undertaken by the Los Angeles Superior 
Court aimed at minimizing delays have resulted in a reduction of the 
four- or five-year time lapse until trial prevalent in the 1980s and early 
1990s to a system where, as of 2002, ninety percent of cases were re-
solved within one year and ninety-eight percent were resolved within 
eighteen months.171  Such drastic improvement was attained through 
the implementation of a flexible “Fast Track” program, improvements 
in pretrial procedures, increased use of technological resources such 
as electronic filing, and procedural unification efforts that simplified 
and standardized court rules.172
While there are obviously a great number of practical manifesta-
tions of the time-delay-reduction principle and virtually endless per-
mutations of reform initiatives, certain elements are prerequisites for 
the success of any such effort.  Thorough statistical analysis should be 
undertaken prior to the institution of any modifications to the current 
system to identify the nature, extent, and causes of the existing de-
lay.173  Implementation of effective and sustainable delay-reduction 
techniques also requires the support and education of all relevant 
constituencies,174 particularly judges, “who must be the formal leaders 
168 Id. 
169 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 166, at 17-20.  The “Day Backward” 
program was instituted to systematically address backlogged cases while the “Day For-
ward” program was created to schedule currently incoming cases for prompt trials.  Id. 
170 Id. at 24. 
171 Robert H. O’Brien, The Success of Delay Reduction in the Civil Trial Courts, 25 L.A. 
LAW., Mar. 2002, at 64. 
172 Id. at 64-66. 
173 See, e.g., DEFEATING DELAY, supra note 140, at 14-18 (emphasizing the impor-
tance of data collection and analysis). 
174 See id. at 66-68 (discussing the necessity of involving as many participants as 
possible and educating them about the goals and operation of any changes). 
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of the reform effort.”175  Finally, “[i]n choosing the change tactics, the 
team must understand the nature of the system.”176  Keeping the sys-
temic effects of any proposed reforms at the forefront of the discus-
sion would ensure that improvements do not result in unintended 
consequences that exacerbate the problem they are intended to ame-
liorate.177  This includes recognizing when the expedited disposition 
of a case is not appropriate.  Whether due to injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff that need time to stabilize or discovery-related time require-
ments, there are certainly instances when delay is necessary and even 
desirable.178  Therefore, a successful delay-reducing initiative must in-
clude a screening mechanism for the “identification of those cases 
that need special handling.”179
A minimization of case disposition time alone would not achieve 
perfect equilibrium between the litigation finance industry’s strengths 
and weaknesses.  Other proposals for improving the litigation finance 
industry include such diverse ideas as forming a state-run public auc-
tion market for champerty, in which litigation finance companies bid 
on claims and the defendant retains the right to match the highest 
bid;180 applying truth-in-lending requirements to the industry;181 creat-
ing a competitive exchange market for tort claims;182 allowing attor-
neys to invest in their clients’ suits;183 and instituting consumer-
175 Id. at 8; see also id. at 40 (“The most important concept for delay reduction is 
the acceptance by the court, rather than the lawyers or the litigants, of the responsibility 
for the pace of litigation.” (emphasis added)); id. at 41 (“[T]he techniques designed 
must make the most efficient use of the scarcest resource of the court system, the 
judge’s time.”). 
176 Id. at 62 (emphasis added). 
177 Failing to take a systems view may cause unintended results.  For example, ciga-
rettes with lower nicotine content actually increase the intake of carcinogens “as smok-
ers compensate for the low nicotine content by smoking more cigarettes per day.”  
STERMAN, supra note 143, at 9.  Other examples include certain antibiotics, which have 
the unintended effect of stimulating “drug-resistant pathogens” and antilock brakes, 
which “cause some people to drive more aggressively, offsetting some of their bene-
fits.”  Id. 
178 See Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal:  Understanding the Importance of 
Avoiding Unnecessary Delay in the Resolution of Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 880, 
895-96 (2000) (identifying situations where delay is appropriate). 
179 O’Brien, supra note 171, at 65. 
180 See Bond, supra note 34, at 1320-22 (setting forth his proposed system of “public 
champerty”). 
181 See Martin, supra note 3, at 68-69 (suggesting that the Truth in Lending Act be 
amended to include litigation finance). 
182 See Swan, supra note 62, at 817 (advocating a free market for legal claims). 
183 See Moliterno, supra note 5, at 256-57 (proposing changes to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct). 
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friendly policies such as a rescission period and a notarization re-
quirement to ensure that a plaintiff’s attorney reviews any litigation 
finance agreement.184  While each of these proposals may very well 
prove useful to regulate litigation finance, without confronting the 
broader reality of a civil court system leaden with backlog, none will 
lead to sustainable success for either the litigation finance industry or 
the people it purports to serve. 
If implemented in isolation, these proposals, by virtue of their 
failure to take a systems approach, would be left vulnerable to a multi-
tude of problems.  One likely pitfall is the systemic phenomenon of 
unintended consequences and burden shifting,185 in which supposed 
solutions simply transfer a problem to another area rather than truly 
eradicating it.  Others include “compensating feedback,” which occurs 
when “well-intentioned interventions call forth responses from the sys-
tem that offset the benefits;”186 the “easy way out” leading back in;187 
and the “cure [proving] worse than the disease,” when “short-term 
improvements lead[] to long-term dependency.”188  The usefulness of 
systems analysis and the delay reduction it counsels lie in the aware-
ness of and preparation for these possibilities that it affords. 
When combined with other potential changes to the litigation fi-
nance industry (such as those mentioned above), a time delay reduc-
tion would address the root, rather than merely the symptoms, of the 
problems a plaintiff seeking justice faces.  Due to their cognizance of 
the systemic nature of the civil justice process, efforts to decrease dis-
position time thus would set the stage for sustainable reform.189
184 See Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act:  A Regu-
latory Framework to Legitimize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 
347, 353 (2004) (laying out suggested reforms); Press Release, supra note 19 (publiciz-
ing consumer-friendly changes agreed to by certain litigation finance companies). 
185 See SENGE, supra note 116, at 57 (“Today’s problems come from yesterday’s ‘solu-
tions.’”); supra note 177 and accompanying text (providing examples of unintended 
side effects).  This principle leaves linear thinkers intent on reform with a choice be-
tween Scylla and Charybdis, as the avoidance of one problem simply creates another, 
potentially worse, one. 
186 SENGE, supra note 116, at 58 (“[T]he harder you push, the harder the system 
pushes back; the more effort you expend trying to improve matters, the more effort 
seems to be required.”). 
187 Id. at 60-61 (acknowledging that while it is comforting to apply “familiar solu-
tions,” they often result in aggravation of the underlying problem). 
188 Id. at 61. 
189 Id. at 62 (“[A]ny long-term solution must . . . strengthen the ability of the sys-
tem to shoulder its own burdens.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
An efficacious long-term approach to litigation finance must en-
sure that consumers are protected and remove obstacles to settlement 
while still permitting the industry to fulfill its role in the marketplace 
of providing a necessary financial service.  Although there are several 
existing legal doctrines—such as champerty, usury, and contract prin-
ciples—that could potentially be used or modified to regulate litiga-
tion finance, as well as a multitude of other proposals for addressing 
the industry’s shortcomings, no reform is likely to be successful unless 
accompanied by a decrease in the disposition time for civil claims.  A 
reduction in time delay would make the civil court system drastically 
more efficient and would provide a holistic measure of required con-
trol over the litigation finance industry. 
 
